UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

8-3-2021

State v. Yehle Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48515

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"State v. Yehle Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48515" (2021). Not Reported. 7174.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7174

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Electronically Filed
8/3/2021 9:25 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #8701
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ERICA LEE YEHLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
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NO. 48515-2020
CANYON COUNTY NO. CR14-19-12761

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Erica Yehle appeals, contending the district court abused its discretion when it rejected
the joint recommendations for probation and left that determination to the parole board instead.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Yehle entered an Alford plea1 to possession of
methamphetamine. (R., pp.52, 55.) In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss a misdemeanor
paraphernalia charge and a persistent violator enhancement. (R., p.55.) She also agreed to pay

1

See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
1

restitution. (R., p.56.) The plea agreement did not place any restrictions on the parties’ ability to
argue for length of sentence. (R., p.55.)
Nevertheless, the State recommended the district court suspend Ms. Yehle’s sentence for
a period of probation. (Tr., p.15, Ls.2-5 (recommending an underlying sentence of five years,
with two years fixed).) Defense counsel joined the recommendation for probation. (Tr., p.15,
Ls.11-14 (recommending an underlying sentence of four years, with two years fixed).)
Ms. Yehle took full responsibility for her actions, explaining she had allowed herself to relapse
back into the cycle of addiction following her divorce. (Tr., p.16, L.25 - p.17, L.9.) She
explained she was simply requesting leniency to allow her to remain in the community and get
back into her children’s lives. (Tr., p.17, Ls.4-7.)
The GAIN-I evaluation recommended level 2.1 intensive outpatient treatment for her
substance abuse issues, and the mental health examination report noted that she has mental
health issues which will also require treatment. (PSI, pp.32, 36-37) To that point, Ms. Yehle
had gotten herself accepted in the Rising Sun program.2 (PSI, p.9; compare PSI, pp.4-5 (the PSI
author opining Ms. Yehle initially had a poor attitude toward rehabilitation).) However, defense
counsel also pointed out Ms. Yehle was incarcerated on other felony charges with trials
scheduled for a couple months later. (Tr., p.16, Ls.2-7.)
The district court rejected the joint recommendation for probation, determining it was not
appropriate at this time.

(Tr., p.18, Ls.11-15.) It based that decision on its concern that

Ms. Yehle had been unable to complete prior terms of probation, particularly given that she had
completed two periods of retained jurisdiction. (Tr., p.17, L.24 - p.18, L.10.) Rather, it imposed

2

Her new boyfriend also noted she could live with him if the need arose. (PSI, p.9.) At the
sentencing hearing, defense counsel also noted that Ms. Yehle had been accepted into a second
sober living facility, but her preference remained the Rising Sun program. (Tr., p.16, Ls.11-15)
2

and executed a unified term of two years, all indeterminate, stating that would put the question of
her release back into the community would be up to the parole board “when they feel you’re
ready.” (Tr., p.19, L.20 - p.20, L.1.)
Ms. Yehle filed a notice of appeal timely from the resulting judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.111, 125.)

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by not suspending Ms. Yehle’s sentence for a
period of probation despite the joint recommendation to that effect.

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Suspending Ms. Yehle’s Sentence For A Period
Of Probation Despite The Joint Recommendation To That Effect
Sentencing decisions are committed to the district court’s discretion. State v. Reinke, 103
Idaho 771, 771 (Ct. App. 1982). Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed
an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the
record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See id. at 772. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of
discretion in the district court’s sentencing decision, he must show that, in light of the governing
criteria, the sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho
293, 294 (1997); see Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018) (articulating the
standard for reviewing whether the district court abused its discretion). The governing criteria,
or sentencing objectives, are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the
public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993).

3

The protection of society is the primary objective the court should consider. Id. The
Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that rehabilitation is usually the first means the district court
should consider to achieve that goal. See State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded
on other grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015); accord State v. Bickhart, 164
Idaho 204, 206 (Ct. App. 2018) (noting the preference identified in McCoy does not preclude a
sentence of incarceration, if that is ultimately the best method to achieve the goals of
sentencing). In other words, while the district court may place significant weight on one of the
goals of sentencing, that does not mean it can ignore mitigating factors speaking to one of the
other goals as being insignificant or unimportant. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320
(2006) (noting that the failure to sufficiently consider various mitigating factors has resulted in
abuses of sentencing discretion in several cases).
As the applicable statute notes, placement in the community should be the district court’s
first consideration when imposing sentence. I.C. § 19-2521(1)(a). While this does not create a
presumption for probation, it does mean that probation is favored where it is appropriate for the
particular defendant. See, e.g., State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 932 (2005). In this case, a
sufficient consideration of the case should have led to utilizing that option here. For example,
her conduct (possession of methamphetamine) did not threaten or cause harm.

I.C. § 19-

2521(2)(a)-(b).
Additionally, as the GAIN-I evaluation specifically concluded (PSI, pp.32), Ms. Yehle’s
substance abuse issues would be best addressed via intensive outpatient treatment. See I.C. § 192521(2)(c). In fact, she had secured a place in two sober living programs which would provide
that sort of treatment. (PSI, p.9.) The fact that she had struggled before in her efforts at
probation, while concerning, does not ultimately change that conclusion.

4

That is because

rehabilitation is a process, not a one-time event. See, e.g., State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 815
(Ct. App. 2010) (recognizing the rehabilitation process by noting that “acknowledgment of guilt
is a critical first step toward rehabilitation”) (emphasis added); cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 38
n.64 (1967) (acknowledging that “counsel can play an important role in the process of
rehabilitation” for juvenile offenders) (emphasis added).

As such, it is not reasonable to

downplay that particular sentencing objective just because prior efforts toward rehabilitation
were not been as successful as they might have been. Compare United States v. Hawkins, 380
F.Supp.2d 143, 144 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (explaining that “[t]he fact that the defendant engaged in
further criminal activity while she was in the process of rehabilitation does not preclude a finding
of extraordinary rehabilitation” or the imposition of a more lenient sentence to promote
continued rehabilitation).
As such, allowing for such an opportunity to help Ms. Yehle get herself back on track,
particularly when she had already secured a place in such programs herself, would best serve all
the goals of sentencing.3 After all, she did accept responsibility for her actions in this case
(Tr., p.16, L.25 - p.17, L.9), and that indicates she has already taken the first steps towards
reestablishing her rehabilitation process. See Kellis, 148 Idaho at 815. Additionally, she agreed
to pay restitution in this case, which further demonstrates her initial steps toward getting her
rehabilitation back on track. I.C. § 19-2521(2)(f); State v. Hall, 114 Idaho 887, 889 (Ct. App.
1988).

3

Of course, Ms. Yehle and the district court could have reconsidered the terms of any such
placement on probation based on the outcome of her other pending trials, but at the time of her
sentencing, it would still have been worthwhile to focus on getting the treatment which the
evaluations recommended rather than wait for the parole board to sort that out. However, out of
candor, Ms. Yehle acknowledges that she was subsequently convicted and sentenced to a period
of incarceration in the subsequent trial.
5

Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by not suspending Ms. Yehle’s sentence
and essentially deferring that decision to the parole board.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Yehle respectfully requests that this Court remand her case for a new sentencing in
which this sentence would be suspended for a period of probation.
DATED this 3rd day of August, 2021.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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